JACKSONFINAL_SEVEN

1/22/2010 5:16:11 PM

Comments
HEAVY BACKPACKS: RES JUDICATA AND
APPROPRIATE NOTICE TO
CREDITORS DURING A STUDENT LOAN
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
Steven Jackson*
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Discharge-by-Declaration: Res Judicata and Notice
Requirements When Showing Undue Burden
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals contentiously reaffirmed
its split with five other circuits regarding both the res judicata effects of a
bankruptcy discharge for a creditor seeking repayment of a student loan
purportedly discharged in a confirmed bankruptcy plan and the notice
requirements a student debtor must satisfy when showing that his or her
student loan is an undue burden during a bankruptcy petition.1 Congress
requires a student seeking to discharge his or her loan through bankruptcy

* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. Copyright ©
2009 Steven Jackson. From April 2004 to December 2006, the author represented the
former governor of Ohio before the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Departments of Education
and Labor, specializing in education and workforce development issues. During the
summer of 2008, the author assisted the U.S. Department of Education as a summer intern,
helping to develop and review new regulations pertaining to proposed changes to the
Income Contingent Repayment Plan (ICRP), early childhood education and special
education.
1. See Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1205 (9th Cir.
2008) (“What appears to be going on is that courts are re-casting what may be a simple
statutory violation as a denial of due process so that they can set aside judgments with which
they're unhappy. This approach is not consistent with the theory of objective judging.”).
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to show that the loan would pose an undue burden if the loan is excluded
from the bankruptcy petition—if there is no showing of undue burden, the
loan remains enforceable against the debtor.2 The specific contentions
concern what is known as discharge-by-declaration and also concern the
creditor’s subsequent due process rights.3 In discharge-by-declaration, a
student may show undue burden when: (1) the student includes a
declaratory statement in his or her bankruptcy petition that his or her
student loan is an undue burden, and (2) the creditor does not object.4 An
objection to the discharge of a loan by the creditor triggers an adversarial
proceeding during the bankruptcy petition and, as will be seen, the debtor
then has to satisfy either the Brunner test or the totality of the
circumstances test to show undue hardship.5 These two tests measure the
burden of the loan on the student seeking to prove undue burden through an
adversarial process.
The student may also initiate an adversarial
proceeding before the creditor objects, but this situation is beyond the
scope of the circuit split examined here because res judicata and
appropriate notice by the student are not issues once the adversarial
proceeding occurs during the bankruptcy proceeding, assuming appropriate
notice is served to the creditor and the other requirements of res judicata
have been fulfilled.6 This circuit split contains two areas ripe for
examination: (1) whether a creditor that ignores a declaration of undue
burden is later precluded from litigating the existence of undue burden on
the student debtor (and thus whether the loan was discharged by the
bankruptcy plan),7 and (2) whether the debtor violates the due process
2. See 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (2006)
(A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . .
unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose
an undue hardship on the debtor . . . for an educational benefit overpayment or
loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any
program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution; or an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit.).
3. Compare In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 2007) (describing former
agreement with the Ninth Circuit on discharge-by-declaration); Whelton v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp., 432 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring an adversarial proceeding for res
judicata to attach to a showing of undue burden); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir.
2005) (same); Ruehle v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Ruehle), 412 F.3d 679, 682-83
(6th Cir. 2005) (same); Banks v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Banks), 299 F.3d 296,
302-03 (4th Cir. 2002) (same), with Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1205 (allowing discharge-bydeclaration to be sufficient for res judicata to attach to a showing of undue burden).
4. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Repp (In re Repp), 307 B.R. 144, 151-52
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the process for a Chapter 13 discharge and the lessened
notice requirements compared to a typical adversarial civil proceeding).
5. See infra Part I.C (discussing these two tests).
6. See infra Part III.B (examining Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood,
541 U.S. 440).
7. This is essentially a res judicata argument. Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1199.
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rights of the creditor by failing to serve the creditor with the complaint and
summons to an adversarial proceeding, as required by other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.8
This paper examines two possible resolutions to the circuit split. The
Supreme Court has hinted at how it might rule to resolve the split in dictum
of Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood.9 It seems likely,
given Hood, that the Ninth Circuit’s decision is an outlier, likely to be
overruled. This position is further bolstered by congressional intent and
legislative history underlying the undue burden provision. The second
potential resolution to the split can be drawn out of two First Circuit cases
which will be examined.10 These cases essentially apply the terms of the
twenty-five-year Income Contingent Repayment Plan (ICRP), an
alternative repayment plan offered to low-income students by the U.S.
Department of Education (the “Department”), to a bankruptcy discharge,
effectively turning the proceeding into a twenty-five-year bankruptcy
discharge. Though the First Circuit cases were not concerned with res
judicata or notice to creditors, their rulings unwittingly posit a scenario
where neither res judicata nor notice to the creditors matter, thus presenting
a second possible solution to the circuit split. Applying the ICRP terms to
student loan bankruptcy petitions addresses the concerns of both the debtor
and creditor properly.11 However, before examining these solutions, it is
necessary to outline the current problem in more detail.
B.

Background: The Current State of Student Loan Discharge and the
Department’s ICRP

Student loans are big business. The Department guaranteed $98.3
billion loaned by private lenders through the Federal Family Education
Loan Program (FFELP)12 and provided an additional $16.5 billion in direct
loans to students in federal fiscal year 2007 alone.13 The loans made
through FFELP are originated and serviced by private lenders, who then

8. See infra Part III.A (discussing the notice requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P.
7001(6), 7003 and 7004).
9. 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
10. See In re Brunell, 356 B.R. 567, 581 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (discharging a student
loan after the expiration of the Income Contingent Repayment Plan’s twenty-five-year
repayment term rather than at the end of the typical three to five year term of a Chapter 13
plan); Austin v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Austin), No. 03-18868-WCH 2005 Bankr.
LEXIS 2425, at *3-4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (same).
11. See infra Part III.C (examining Brunell and Austin).
12. U.S. Department of Education, Funding Status - - Federal Family Education Loan
(FFEL) Program, http://www.ed.gov/programs/ffel/funding.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
13. U.S. Department of Education, Funding Status - - William D. Ford Federal Direct
Loan Program, http://www.ed.gov/programs/wdffdl/funding.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).

JACKSONFINAL_SEVEN

238

1/22/2010 5:16:11 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:1

profit from the repayment of the loans with interest.14 Thus, the private
lenders have an incentive to ensure that students make timely repayments,
or, at the very least, the lenders will try to collect as much as they can from
the student if the loan goes into bankruptcy or otherwise becomes nonperforming, as they would with any other loan. Students are often younger
individuals with short or non-existent credit histories, and, lacking
significant assets to use as collateral, student loans are often originated on
an unsecured basis. Thus, there is nothing for the creditor to repossess
once the student stops repaying the student loan. Also, unlike most loans,
lenders have additional difficulties collecting upon student loans because
“the capital improvement bestowed upon the debtor exists in an amorphous
and intangible state when compared to the traditional loan . . . [the
improvement bestowed] is beyond seizure, garnishment, or repossession.”15
Ben Franklin accurately stated the case when he said that the best place to
hide one’s fortune is in one’s head, where it cannot be taken by anybody,
especially a jilted lender attempting repossession.16
Despite these impediments to lending, student loan origination
remains a multi-billion-dollar industry, measured by funds available for
students to borrow per year.17 What, other than proscribed usurious rates,
could explain handing billions of dollars over to borrowers with limited
credit histories and few assets to put up as collateral to secure the loans
made for an asset from which it is nearly impossible to forcibly collect the
proceeds? The size and growth of the student loan industry over the recent
decades is essentially a result of government policy.18 To promote its
policy of expanded access to education, the federal government, through
the Department, guarantees interest and principal on loans made by private
lenders, thereby encouraging those lenders to extend credit to borrowers
who may not normally qualify.19 However, the government has not issued
a blank check to students (and lenders), and perceived abuses in the
repayment system has led Congress to enact the “undue hardship,” or

14. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., The Federal Family Education Loan
Program, http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/ffelp.htm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2009).
15. Kevin C. Driscoll Jr., Eradicating the "Discharge by Declaration" for Student Loan
Debt in Chapter 13, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1311, 1315 (2000).
16. DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN ENGLISH AND FOREIGN
SOURCES 171 (James Wood, ed., 1899) (“If a man empties his purse into his head, no man
can take it away from him.”).
17. Cf. U.S. Department of Education, supra note 12. (“FFEL loan volume (aid
available) . . . was $119.2 billion in FY 2006, $98.3 billion in FY 2007, and is estimated to
be $90.2 billion in FY 2008.”).
18. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 523.14[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
15th ed. rev.) [hereinafter COLLIER].
19. Id.
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undue burden, exception to discharge of a student loan in bankruptcy.20
This clause purportedly prevents students from discharging their loans by
filing for bankruptcy immediately upon graduation and also ensures the
financial integrity of the loan system.21 As mentioned above, the student
seeking discharge of his student loan, often through a Chapter 7 or Chapter
13 bankruptcy filing, must show that continuing to pay the loan will prove
to be an undue burden were the loan exempted from the bankruptcy
repayment plan. However, Congress left the courts to define what
constitutes an undue burden and determine the scope of its application.
C.

Undue Burden: The Brunner Test and the Totality of the
Circumstances Test

Though there is an additional minor circuit split on the precise factual
situation that will prove to be an undue burden on the student, a brief
recitation of the two tests used by the various circuits illuminates what is
usually considered to be an undue burden and will suffice to describe the
conditions under which courts will find an undue burden. This proves
important when considering the potential solution drawn out of the
bankruptcy courts of the First Circuit applying the twenty-five-year term of
the ICRP repayment to a bankruptcy discharge because the tax effects of
ICRP forgiveness are a major component of an undue burden
determination.
The test to determine what constitutes an undue burden used in
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Services Corp. prevails in most of the
circuit courts.22 The Brunner test requires the debtor seeking discharge to
show:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a ‘minimal’ standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans;
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of
affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the
repayment period of the student loans; and
(3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the
loans.23
The Eighth Circuit applies a totality of the circumstances test, which
examines “(1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future
financial resources; (2) a calculation of the debtor’s and her dependent’s
20.
21.
22.
23.
1987).

Id. at P 523.LH.
Id. at P 523.14.
Id.
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.

JACKSONFINAL_SEVEN

240

1/22/2010 5:16:11 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:1

reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and
circumstances.”24 While a debtor must meet all three prongs of the
Brunner test to prove undue hardship, the totality of the circumstances test
is more flexible and fact-dependent.25 The two tests essentially differ over
what constitutes a good faith effort to repay an educational loan. However,
under either test, the debtor still must show a sufficiently undue burden to
have the educational loan included in the bankruptcy discharge.26
The Department’s ICRP further complicates matters for both the
debtor seeking discharge of his or her student loan through bankruptcy and
the bankruptcy courts attempting to determine an undue burden. The
Department provides the ICRP as a relief option for a debtor who is unable
to pay the full amount of his or her loan; the ICRP allows the debtor to put
twenty percent of his or her discretionary income toward the repayment of
the loan while unpaid interest accrues and is added to the original principal,
up to ten percent of the original principal amount, further interest being
deferred during the twenty-five-year repayment period, after which the
entire remaining amount is discharged.27 Some courts require a student
debtor to explore the option of entering the ICRP as an alternative means of
discharge before granting a bankruptcy discharge of the student loan; other
courts, noting that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) imposes tax upon an
ICRP discharge but not upon a bankruptcy discharge, have not made the
exploration of entering the ICRP a prerequisite of the student debtor’s
bankruptcy discharge.28 Thus, at least in some circuits, a debtor must meet
a fairly high burden to show not only that the debtor’s financial situation is
penurious and is likely to remain so, but also that the debtor has explored a
range of options to have the loan otherwise forgiven. Though the
24. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003).
The bankruptcy courts of the First Circuit are free to choose between the Brunner test and
the totality of the circumstances test. See, e.g., In re Brunell, 356 B.R. 567, 575-76 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2006) (noting that the “absence of controlling authority” in the First Circuit leaves
“courts . . . free to choose [their] own approach in evaluating undue hardship.”).
25. In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554.
26. See also In re Brunell, 356 B.R. at 581 (imposing the twenty-five-year term of the
ICRP on the repayment of a loan discharged through bankruptcy to avoid tax liability upon
discharge of the loan); Compare Thomsen v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomsen), 234 B.R. 506,
509-510 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (finding good faith under the third prong of the Brunner
test by a debtor who did not seek to enter the Department’s ICRP due to potential tax
liability accruing to an individual whose loan is discharged through the ICRP), with In re
Tirch, 409 F.3d 677, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring a debtor seeking bankruptcy
discharge of a student loan to have first attempted to have the loan discharged through the
ICRP), and In re Burton, 339 B.R. 856 at n.48 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) (same, basing its
reasoning on the speculative nature at the time of the bankruptcy petition of the tax liability
when a loan is discharged through the ICRP twenty-five-years later).
27. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209 (2008).
28. See COLLIER, supra note 18, at P 523.14[2] (describing the interaction between the
ICRP and bankruptcy discharge vis-à-vis taxable income).
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Department is currently working on regulations that, if recognized by the
IRS, would allow a loan discharged through the ICRP to be counted as
non-taxable income, debtors in the meantime are best served financially by
trying to discharge their loans through the bankruptcy process, for both
finality and tax purposes.29
However, even under current regulations, this split may be resolved by
other means.30 The resolution of this circuit split will have a significant
impact upon the method most likely to be used by students to discharge
their student loans. Lenders will pay particular attention to the resolution
of this split and will adjust the cost of student borrowing accordingly.
Additionally, if the First Circuit method described below is expanded to
include all student debtors seeking a bankruptcy discharge, the real-world
impact of the current circuit split is marginalized. The final point to
examine before the possible resolutions of this circuit split is the actual
split itself.
II.

THE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDING: RES JUDICATA, NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS AND DISCHARGE-BY-DECLARATION

A.

Res Judicata: The Statutory Arguments Regarding Whether a Loan
Discharged-by-Declaration is a Final Order which Precludes Further
Collection Efforts and Lawsuits by Creditors against Student Debtors

Res judicata ensures that issues decided in litigation are not
endlessly re-litigated between the parties in new lawsuits.31 The principle
also effectively eliminates the ability of one party to challenge a decided
issue except when that party claims the deciding court committed an error.
The losing party may only challenge the decision on the basis that it is void
and thus could be of no effect once the party foregoes a direct appeal.32
Nwosun v. General Mills Restaurants, Inc., a widely-cited case, succinctly
defines the four elements usually required for an issue to be subject to res
judicata:
(1) the prior suit must have ended with a judgment on the merits;
29. Internal Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Education (Aug. 15, 2008) (on
file with the author). The developing regulations may also seek to eliminate the income
qualifications for student debtors seeking to enter the ICRP. Id.
30. See infra Part III.C (describing the application of the ICRP offered by the
Department to the bankruptcy discharge).
31. Restatement of Judgments (Second) § 17 (1980) (defining the two components,
issue and claim preclusion, of res judicata); See also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.
742, 748 (2001) (endorsing the definition in the Restatement of Judgments (Second)).
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. § 60(b)(4) (“[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reason[] . . . [if] the judgment is void.”).
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(2) the parties must be identical or in privity; (3) the suit must be
based on the same cause of action; and (4) the plaintiff must have
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the prior
suit.33
The circuit split between the Ninth Circuit and the others centers first
on whether the elements of res judicata, as applied within the specific
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, are fulfilled by a discharge-bydeclaration. The second issue is whether res judicata principles are
appropriate to apply in a bankruptcy proceeding due to the unique nature of
such a proceeding within the court system and the specific positive law of
the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, it is important to outline the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code and Federal Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure (which often
incorporate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as binding) at issue.
Almost all student debtors, indeed almost all real (as opposed to
corporate) persons, file bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code.34 For most purposes, courts do not seem to
distinguish between these two chapters when determining the applicability
of persuasive or precedential authority in relation to student loans
discharged in bankruptcy.35 Both Chapter 736 and Chapter 1337 contain

33. 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997).
34. Cf. Riva D. Atlas & Eric Dash, Bracing for a Bankruptcy Rush, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2005, at C1 (explaining that most individuals file Chapter 7 bankruptcies but noting that
the new means test requirement for Chapter 7 will force individuals to declare Chapter 13
bankruptcy more often). Chapter 7 is the liquidation chapter. Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts,
U.S. COURTS - BANKRUPTCY - BASICS - PROCESS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/process.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2009). Chapter 13 allows for a fixed term repayment plan determined by the bankruptcy
court in which a reduced repayment plan is produced and, if followed by the debtor, allows
discharge of the debts at the end of the repayment term, usually three to five years. Id. The
other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, other than Chapter 11 (reorganization), deal with
specific situations which could not apply to individual students seeking discharge of student
loans. Id. Chapter 11 is rarely used by real persons, unless they own significant assets, as it
allows creditors to receive partial repayment from the reorganization (sale or continued use)
of the individual’s assets before discharge of the debts and gives the creditors much more
control over discharge of the debtor’s debts. Id. See also, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, U.S. COURTS - BANKRUPTCY - BASICS - CHAPTER 11,
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter11.html#background
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009). Chapters 1, 3, and 5 contain general provisions applicable to the
later chapters. COLLIER, supra note 18, at P 1.01.
35. The courts routinely cite to case law as binding, controlling, or otherwise
persuasive—even when the citation is to a bankruptcy case filed under a different chapter of
the Bankruptcy Code—provided the applicable provisions are either similar between the
chapters or refer to general provisions of the Bankruptcy Code contained in Chapters 1, 3, or
5. See generally, In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1048 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing approvingly
to a Chapter 7 case even though the debtor in question filed under Chapter 13).
36. 11 U.S.C. 727(a) (2006).
37. 11 U.S.C. 1327(a) (2006).
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general provisions describing a discharge as a final binding order to which
res judicata would apply. The penalty imposed on a creditor violating the
discharge by trying to collect a discharged debt – either judicially or extrajudicially – is a civil contempt citation.38 However, each chapter also has a
provision which can be read either to limit the general discharge provision
or can be read alongside it to operate in a separate sphere. In Chapter 7, the
specific provision at issue states: “Except as provided in section 523 of this
title, a discharge under [Chapter 7] discharges the debtor from all debts.”39
Chapter 13 contains slightly different wording: “[T]he court shall grant the
debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan . . . except any debt
. . . of the kind specified in . . . section 523(a).”40 Much like the
precedential authority of bankruptcy cases decided by the Supreme Court,
courts seem to treat these as distinctions without differences, and apply the
same reasoning whether the case is a Chapter 13 or a Chapter 7 case.
While much could be made of a potential difference between the two
sections, the following analysis comports with the courts that lump Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 cases together.
The core of the disagreement between the circuit courts centers on
whether the undue hardship requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) requires
an adversarial proceeding for the discharge to have res judicata effect.41
Those courts proscribing discharge-by-declaration look to congressional
intent and the operation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) in conjunction with §§
727(b) and 1328(a)(2) and with the procedural rules of bankruptcy.42 The
Ninth Circuit, however, reads the discharge provisions of the relevant
chapter together with 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) in such a way as to construe a
discharge, even by declaration, as a final, binding order which may not be
challenged unless the order is void.43 The Ninth Circuit also does not
believe that the principles of res judicata are even the appropriate principles
to apply due to the equitable nature of a bankruptcy discharge.44
38. See COLLIER, supra note 18, at P 524.02[2][c] ("Civil contempt is the normal
sanction for violations of the discharge injunction.”); COLLIER also notes that discharge
"provides for a broad injunction against not only legal proceedings, but also any other acts
to collect a discharged debt as a personal liability of the debtor”). Id. at P 524.02[2]
39. 11 U.S.C. 727(b) (2006).
40. 11 U.S.C. 1328(a)(2) (2006).
41. The circuit split on the amount of notice required of student debtors to their
creditors is contained within this disagreement. If an adversarial proceeding is required, a
student must serve a complaint and a summons on the creditor, rather than simply notifying
the creditor that there is a bankruptcy proceeding and that the debt relevant to that creditor is
included in the petition. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7003; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004; see also infra
Part II.B (providing an extended treatment of the notice requirements).
42. In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1048 (10th Cir. 2007).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) describes the effect of a bankruptcy discharge under Chapter 7
and Chapter 13.
44. Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008).

JACKSONFINAL_SEVEN

244

1/22/2010 5:16:11 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:1

In contrast, the Tenth Circuit, reversing its own earlier precedent, held
that there must be an adversarial proceeding to determine undue hardship
for res judicata to apply.45 According to the reasoning used by this court,
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) is self-executing, and by operation of Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 7001(6), the section requires an adversarial proceeding.46 Implicit in its
decision is the assumption that Congress left the courts to decide how to
craft the tests for undue burden and the Brunner test requires an affirmative
showing; thus, a student loan cannot be discharged by mere declaration.
The language in 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b) and 1328(a)(2) limits the general
discharge provisions.47 The court also noted the inconsistency inherent in
confirming a bankruptcy plan that violates other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.48 Using similar reasoning, the Second, Fourth, Sixth and
Seventh Circuits agree.49 However, the Ninth Circuit believes that the
language of 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b) and 1328(a)(2) operates in its own sphere;
that is, the language operates solely during the discharge petition.50 Rather
than limiting the general provisions allowing discharge to have final,
preclusive effect after the discharge has been entered, these provisions are
read to apply only during the petition itself and do not operate after the
confirmation of the bankruptcy plan.51 If the creditor does not object
during the proceeding, a debtor who includes a statement that the burden of
his or her loan is an undue burden receives a preclusive discharge once the
discharge is entered. The discharge provisions of these chapters may be
read in conjunction with the provision detailing the effect of a discharge,

45. See In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d at 1047-48 (“Congress evinced the unmistakable
intent to make student loan debts ‘presumptively nondischargeable’ and to ‘singl[e them]
out for an individualized adjudication’” (citing Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v.
Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450 (2004))); the Tenth Circuit reversed its decision in Andersen v.
UNIPAC-NEBHELP (In re Andersen) which had allowed discharge-by-declaration. 179
F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1999).
46. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 451 (2004).
47. See In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d at 1048 (“[Section] 1328(a)(2)'s specific
pronouncement must be read as limiting § 1327(a)'s broad res judicata effect.”); see also
Whelton v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 432 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A debtor who
claims ‘undue hardship’ to defeat the statutory presumption against a student loan discharge
must [satisfy the Brunner test]. Under the Bankruptcy Code, discharge of a student loan
debt cannot be adjudicated in a summary proceeding.”) (internal citations omitted).
48. In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d at 1048 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1)).
49. See In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 2005) (proscribing discharge-bydeclaration); Whelton, 432 F.3d at 155 (same); Ruehle v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Ruehle), 412 F.3d 679, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2005) (same); Banks v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp.
(In re Banks), 299 F.3d 296, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2002) (same).
50. Cf. Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir.
2008) (stating that there is no conflict between the Bankruptcy Code’s finality provision and
the bankruptcy rules requiring an adversarial proceeding).
51. See id. (“[A] discharge is a final judgment and cannot be set aside or ignored
because a party suddenly claims, years later, that the trial court committed an error.”).
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whereby a discharge “voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the
extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the
debtor with respect to any debt discharged” and “operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action . . . to collect . . .
any such debt as a personal liability.”52 Further, the Ninth Circuit does not
believe that res judicata is even the correct principle to apply.53 The circuit
views the discharge as an absolute, equitable order that can only be
challenged on direct appeal.
B.

Due Process: Actual Notice to the Student Loan Creditor of the
Bankruptcy Proceeding versus Serving a Complaint and a Summons
on the Student Loan Creditor

The circuits are similarly split regarding the proper notice
requirement students must fulfill in a bankruptcy proceeding to show undue
hardship. The notice issue interacts with res judicata and may be the best
argument against allowing res judicata to control in a discharge-bydeclaration. This is because ineffective notice to the creditor is a reason to
set aside confirmation of the bankruptcy plan as void and not having res
judicata effect after the discharge has been entered.54
The oft-cited description of proper notice promulgated by the
Supreme Court is “notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objection.”55 The
components relevant to an analysis of notice during a bankruptcy
proceeding, as described above, are the “reason[able] calculat[ion], under
all circumstances, . . . to apprise interested parties,” and “afford them an
opportunity to present their objection.”56 The two incompatible strands the
circuits pull from the Supreme Court’s description focus on separate
components.
The Ninth Circuit focuses on the creditor receiving actual notice of the
bankruptcy proceeding. The Ninth Circuit relies on a perception that a
student loan creditor is a sophisticated party holding “large, unsecured
claim[s]” that, once notice of the bankruptcy proceeding is sent via regular
mail to the creditor’s address by the student debtor, has “sufficient
information” such that “any inquiry following receipt of the notice” would
52. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2006).
53. Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1200 (“A discharge injunction does not operate by way of res
judicata; it is, rather, an equitable remedy.”).
54. See, e.g., In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2005) (voiding a bankruptcy
discharge due to the debtor’s noncompliance with the “heightened degree of notice”
required by the Bankruptcy Code).
55. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
56. Id.
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inform the creditor that it needs to act to protect its interest, even when the
bankruptcy plan itself is not sent.57
However, the Seventh Circuit reads the Bankruptcy Code and the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure conjunctively to require more than
actual notice of a bankruptcy hearing where the creditor’s outstanding loan
may or may not be listed in the bankruptcy plan. The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the due process clause does not require a complaint and
a summons, but because the Bankruptcy Code, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in dictum of Hood, requires an adversarial proceeding to
show undue burden, the procedural rules of bankruptcy require a complaint
and a summons.58 Additionally, at least one other circuit has explicitly held
that a student loan could not be discharged without a student debtor serving
the creditor with a complaint and a summons to an adversarial proceeding
to determine undue hardship.59
C.

Implications: The Effects of Discharge-by-Declaration on the
Debtor/Creditor Relationship

The Ninth Circuit’s Espinosa decision has significant real-world
implications. Akin to the business judgment rule, whereby courts will not
second-guess business decisions made in good faith and without a conflictof-interest,60 a creditor may decide against litigating the debtor’s
declaration of undue hardship even when the creditor knows that this will
allow a debtor to discharge the student loan through bankruptcy. This is
because the creditor may determine that it can net more return from the

57. Matter of Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth
Circuit relies on the reasoning in D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. United States, whereby “when a
person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed to be conversant
of it.” 531 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.D.C. 1982). This could also be termed ‘inquiry notice’
because it is notice that would lead a party to inquire into the proceeding to determine
whether any of its rights will be affected by the pending action.
58. Hanson, 397 F.3d at 487:
We do not hold that the due process clause requires the service of a summons
and adversary proceeding prior to the discharge of student loan debt. Rather, we
merely confirm that where the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules require
a heightened degree of notice, due process entitles a party to receive such notice
before an order binding the party will be afforded preclusive effect.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
59. See In re Ruehle, 412 F.3d 679, 685 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Due process demands a
complaint and a summons. The rule is clear.” (quoting In re Ruehle, 296 B.R. 146, 165
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003))).
60. See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES, § 2:10 (2009) (“The business judgment
rule, although variously stated, may be expressed as a presumption that directors making a
business decision, not involving self-interest, acted in good faith and with due care.”).
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debtor by the payments received through the bankruptcy discharge than it
can by litigating the issue and subsequently trying to collect the full
amount.61 The creditor may consciously refuse to object to the undue
hardship declaration, hoping that the debtor will make payments through
the bankruptcy discharge but that the bankruptcy plan will eventually fail.
The full amount of the loan remains enforceable when a bankruptcy plan
fails.62 The amount of the loan also may be insufficient to justify the cost
of litigation.63 Essentially, the creditor may be making a sound business
judgment by initially refusing to object to the debtor’s undue burden
declaration. The creditor may be allowed to “seek a second bite of the
apple by way of a due process argument” unless it is precluded from
litigating the issue of undue hardship after the bankruptcy plan is confirmed
or the discharge is complete.64
III. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

A.

The Ninth Circuit’s Conception of Notice is Insufficient Notice for the
Determination of Undue Hardship in a Bankruptcy Proceeding

Before examining the likely Supreme Court resolution of this circuit
split and the argument to apply the First Circuit’s reasoning regarding the
twenty-five-year term of the ICRP in the broader context of a bankruptcy
discharge, it is necessary to dispense with part of the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning. The Ninth Circuit held that actual notice of a student loan being
listed in a bankruptcy plan and of a declaration of undue burden is
sufficient notice.65 However, the undue burden exception to discharge, as
outlined by the majority of circuits and apparent from congressional intent,
suggests that heightened notice is required.
Initially, student loans were dischargeable in bankruptcy as any
other loan would be unless “insured or guaranteed” directly by the
government.66 In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code (effective in
1979), adding the aforementioned 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) in response to the
perceived fraudulent activity by student debtors of declaring bankruptcy
immediately after graduation to wipe out their student debts.67 In 1998,
61.
2008).
62.
63.
64.
2004).
65.
66.
67.

Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (9th Cir.
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1198.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Repp (In re Repp), 307 B.R. 144, 156 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1203 (9th Cir. 2008).
COLLIER, supra note 18, at P 523.LH.
Id.
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Congress eliminated a provision within 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(8) that allowed
a student loan to be discharged in bankruptcy without a finding of undue
hardship once the debtor had been paying the loan for seven years.68
Further, Congress again revised the Bankruptcy Code in 2005, and, while
these amendments did not affect the provision directly relating to student
loans, the general perception is that Congress attempted to make it more
difficult to successfully complete a bankruptcy petition by lowering the
income threshold for individuals seeking to file under the more generous
provisions of Chapter 7.69 This multi-decade trend in congressional intent
favors creditors by making it more difficult for debtors in general, and
student loan debtors in particular, to file for bankruptcy or discharge their
debts once in bankruptcy. Given these congressional actions, it is unlikely
that the more lenient notice requirement promulgated by the Ninth Circuit,
leading to a preclusive discharge-by-declaration, would be acceptable to
Congress.
Additionally, the drafting committee of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, authorized by Congress to draft and implement
such rules, promulgated rules interpreted by the Supreme Court70 in
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood71 to require service of a
complaint and a summons to the creditor—even though 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8) itself does not require this procedure. This argument invokes the
majority view of the courts outlined above where conjunctively read
sections of the Bankruptcy Code and the procedural rules require first an
adversarial proceeding to determine whether undue hardship exists, and an
adversarial proceeding requires the service of a complaint and a summons
upon the creditor.72
The problem with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in the notice context
is that it assumes too much. Furthermore, as described by one

68. See Andersen v. UNIPAC-NEBHELP (In re Andersen), 179 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th
Cir. 1999) (“We understand that Congress has sought to progressively limit the instances in
which student loan debts may be discharged in bankruptcy, and this intent is most recently
seen in the 1998 amendments which eliminated the ‘seven-year rule’ of dischargeability of
educational loans.”).
69. Cf. Joe Lee & Thomas Parrish, Banks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007, at A15
(noting the more difficult threshold for a Chapter 7 filing under the 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code); Timothy Egan, Debtors in Rush to Bankruptcy as Change Nears, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at A1 (same).
70. See infra Part III.B (examining the resolution of the circuit split by Supreme Court
ruling).
71. 541 U.S. 440, 453-54 (2004).
72. Id.; see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6) (identifying the determination of the
dischargeability of a debt as an adversarial proceeding); Fed. R. of Bankr. P. 7003
(incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 in adversarial proceedings, thus requiring a
complaint to be filed in an adversarial proceeding); Fed. R. of Bankr. P. 7004 (requiring
service of the complaint in an adversarial proceeding).
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commentator and one circuit, it poses practical problems in the particular
case concerned and poses problems for notice generally. The Ninth Circuit
supplies several methods by which the creditor may assume it can collect
more from the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan than from objecting to
the discharge-by-declaration and, thus, the creditor may consciously decide
against objecting to the discharge-by-declaration.73 While this may factor
into a consideration of res judicata, it has no bearing on whether notice was
adequate. The Ninth Circuit attempts to save itself by noting that requiring
service of a complaint and a summons where the specific rights of the
creditor affected are listed is too cumbersome for a debtor and that the
creditors are sophisticated parties who know that their rights will be
affected by a bankruptcy proceeding when they receive the actual notice
that a bankruptcy plan has been filed and the student loan debt the creditor
holds is listed.74 However, this reasoning is flawed for at least three
reasons.
First, the Ninth Circuit ignores congressional intent and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation in Hood.75 Second, this reasoning assumes
that creditors can make an orderly and quick answer to notice of a debt
discharge. As one commentator notes: Chapter 13 hearings take place
quickly and, absent a complaint and a summons, the creditor may not
prioritize an answer to a debt discharge to be able to object before the
hearing occurs.76 Third, the In re Mersmann court notes that the
overarching design of notice requires that a party be informed that its rights
may be affected by the proceeding at hand and that Congress has
specifically accorded certain “heightened notice requirements” in undue
hardship proceedings.77 Curiously, the Ninth Circuit agrees that Congress
may give additional rights to notice beyond actual notice, but the circuit
apparently fails to grasp the significance of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, or perhaps deems that they go beyond their
procedural borders to expand or contract substantive rights, in the context
of an undue burden determination.78 More significantly, if a party did not

73. Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (9th Cir.
2008); see also supra Part II.C (discussing the business judgment rule).
74. See id. at 1203 (holding that actual notice is constitutionally adequate notice for a
creditor who faces a debtor seeking a discharge-by-declaration).
75. See infra Part III.B (examining the resolution of the circuit split by a Supreme Court
ruling).
76. See Driscoll, supra note 15, at 1320 (“[T]he [Chapter 13] confirmation hearing may
have already happened by the time the notice moves from the mailroom to the appropriate
office.”).
77. See In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1043 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting the heightened
notice requirement of an undue hardship determination when compared to the notice
required to merely confirm a Chapter 13 plan).
78. Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1204.
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receive constitutionally adequate notice, res judicata would not apply, and
the original judgment would be void.79
B.

The Requirement of an Adversarial Proceeding

Though there is no explicit language in the Bankruptcy Code or the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure specifically requiring an
adversarial proceeding to show undue hardship, the Supreme Court will
likely require such an adversarial proceeding once it considers the issue.80
If mandated by the Supreme Court, the requirement of an adversarial
proceeding is a potential resolution of the circuit split regarding res judicata
and notice.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood provides the clearest
hint that the Supreme Court is leaning toward the requirement of an
adversarial proceeding to show undue hardship.81 The debtor in this case,
Ms. Pamela Hood, brought an adversarial proceeding under Chapter 7, and
no party contended that she failed to fulfill the notice requirements.82 Thus,
though the 7 - 2 Supreme Court majority felt the need to outline the
requirement of an adversarial proceeding to show undue hardship, this
discussion is dictum and is not necessary to the resolution of Ms. Hood’s
case.83 However, the ruling is a clear signal from the court as to how it will
most likely rule once it considers the Espinosa case.
Despite this caveat, which is unmentioned in its ruling, the Supreme
Court noted that student loans are not automatically dischargeable.84 Citing
the aforementioned Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Supreme
Court majority decided that “the debtor [is required to] file an ‘adversary
proceeding’ . . . to discharge his student loan debt.”85 Citing the same
procedural rules as discussed above, the Supreme Court majority also noted
that the requirement of an adversarial proceeding further “requires the
service of a summons and a complaint.”86 Not only is this language dictum
for the broad reason that it simply did not matter in Ms. Hood’s case, one
could also argue that it is dictum outside the narrow scope of the identity of

79. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (stating a void judgment as a ground for relief from a
“Final Judgment, Order or Pleading”); see also In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d at 1049 (“[R]es
judicata will not apply where there is inadequate notice [to the creditor of an adversarial
proceeding to determine undue hardship].”).
80. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear the Espinosa case during its 2009
term. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 129 S.Ct. 2791 (2009).
81. 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
82. Id. at 444-45.
83. Id. at 451-52.
84. Id. at 450-52.
85. Id. at 451-52 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6), 7003 and 7004).
86. Id. at 452.
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the student loan creditor in Hood. The creditor in this case was a state
actor (the State of Tennessee), and the primary issue in the case was
whether an adversarial proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) and the
procedural rules of bankruptcy is a suit against a state, violating the
prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment.87
However, assuming that the requirement of an adversarial
proceeding would hold in a broader case brought before the Supreme
Court, the circuit split would be resolved. The four required elements for
res judicata to attach to the decision would be present by requiring an
adversarial proceeding.88 Further, per the procedural rules of bankruptcy,
the student debtor would have to serve a complaint and a summons against
the creditor, negating the distinctions between actual or inquiry notice, and
constitutional or heightened notice, because the creditor would have
constitutionally adequate actual notice.
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the Tenth Circuit, having
formerly agreed with the Ninth Circuit, reversed its position on the res
judicata effect of an undue burden proved by declaration, relying on the
reasoning used in Hood.89 The Tenth Circuit also used the circuits’ trend
toward requiring an adversarial proceeding to show undue burden and that
the inferred policy of Congress is to make it harder for students to
discharge debts as reasoning for its reversal.90 However, the countervailing
policy, indeed the policy undergirding the entire bankruptcy system, is to
allow the debtor a fresh start and to protect creditors from each other by an
orderly and equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets as repayment to the
creditors.91 This is true even when the creditors do not participate in the
bankruptcy proceeding.92 Indeed, both sides of the split cite apparently
conflicting language in Hood.93 Though it will likely be overturned, the use
87. Id.
88. This analysis assumes that the adversarial proceeding would then actually take
place. After allowing for that assumption, it is clear that the suit would end with a judgment
on its merits, the parties would be identical (or in privity to the original parties) in any future
suit, the potential future suit would be based on the same cause of action (an undue burden
determination), and the parties would have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
claim in the prior suit. See generally Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Rests., Inc., 124 F.3d 1255, 1257
(10th Cir. 1997) (describing the four required elements for res judicata to attach).
89. In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1038, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
“[d]ischarge-by-declaration deserves no preclusive effect”).
90. See Smith v. Rockett, 522 F.3d 1080, 1085 (10th Cir. 2008) (O’Brien, J.,
dissenting) (calling on Congress, not judges, to make the final policy decision on whether
undue burden could be proven by an undisputed declaration in the student debtor’s
bankruptcy plan while adhering to the precedential authority of In re Mersmann).
91. See COLLIER, supra note 18, at P 1.03 (describing the two general purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code).
92. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004).
93. Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008); In
re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2007).
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by the Ninth Circuit of Hood in its Espinosa reasoning is legitimate for the
time being, given that the Ninth Circuit can safely ignore the parts of Hood
that are dicta.
C.

Applying the Twenty-Five-Year Repayment Term of the ICRP to a
Bankruptcy Discharge

Two cases in the First Circuit develop reasoning under the
Bankruptcy Code that proves to be a good solution when applied to the
problems of res judicata and appropriate notice in the context of a showing
of undue burden, despite the fact that the cases themselves are unconcerned
with res judicata and notice.
Austin v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Austin)94 first
develops the application of the twenty-five-year ICRP repayment term to a
bankruptcy discharge of a student debtor’s educational loan. The debtor in
this case, Ms. Marcella Austin, filed suit against three student loan
creditors that held her educational loans.95 It is interesting to note that a
default judgment was entered against two of the creditors, allowing
immediate discharge of her loans with respect to those creditors.96
However, one of her creditors, Educational Credit Management
Corporation (ECMC), objected to the discharge, instigating an adversarial
proceeding to show that the loan was an undue burden.97 Additionally, Ms.
Austin claimed that she completely satisfied the prongs of the totality of the
circumstances test by “suffering from a variety of medical problems” and
not having “the current ability to make payments on her remaining student
loans.”98 However, the judge noted that Ms. Austin had not met all of the
elements of the totality of the circumstances test because she had not
shown that her medical condition would continue into the future.99 Despite
this setback, Ms. Austin successfully cited the potential tax liability of the
discharge of the ECMC loan through the ICRP as a reason that the loan
would be an undue burden, even if she paid nothing during the ICRP
repayment term.100 The judge thus ruled that “if there is a balance [at the
end of Ms. Austin’s ICRP repayment term] . . . payment of the tax on the
amount to be forgiven would impose an undue burden . . . and hence [is]
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).”101 This ruling effectively
converted Ms. Austin’s ICRP repayment term into a twenty-five-year
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

No. 03-18868 WCH, 2005 WL 3320568 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 19, 2005).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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contingent bankruptcy discharge, with the final decision on the discharge of
her student loan occurring at the end of the twenty-five years as any tax
liability would prove an undue burden. Her student loan itself, the
amortized interest, and the accrued interest would be discharged by the
ICRP.
The court in In re Brunell102 used similar reasoning, but reserved
additional oversight over the discharge during the twenty-five-year ICRP
repayment term. The student debtor in this case, Ms. Jennifer Brunell,
initially filed a complaint against her student loan creditors to show that her
loans were an undue burden under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8).103 Again, several
of Ms. Brunell’s creditors failed to answer the notice to the adversarial
proceeding, and the court entered a default judgment against those
creditors.104 However, ECMC once again intervened on behalf of one of
the creditors, presumably to do better than it had against Ms. Austin.105 In
this case, Ms. Brunell owed $200,245.77 on her student loans, and the
normal monthly payment over a thirty-year repayment term would be
$1,298.77.106 However, Ms. Brunell earned only $37,000 per year and had
a potential earning range of up to $38,000 per year with additional
increases likely in the future.107 Additionally, Ms. Brunell received some
of her income, $704 per month, in the form of child support from her exhusband.108 After expenses necessary to maintain a minimal standard of
living (as required by this court’s use of the totality of the circumstances
test), the court determined Ms. Brunell’s disposable monthly income to be
$190.54.109 Even though the ICRP minimum payment would likely be
$260.83 per month, slightly more than her disposable monthly income, the
judge ruled that Ms. Brunell’s student loans were not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.110 The judge relied on the prospect for Ms. Brunell to increase
her future income, as well as the proposition that “financial adversity alone
is not sufficient to have a student loan debt discharged on the basis of
undue hardship.”111 Indeed, “cut[ting] her expenses by approximately $70
to $110 in order to be able to make payments on the student loan” is “a
reasonable requirement in order to be able to manage her student loan

102. 356 B.R. 567 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006).
103. Id. at 568.
104. Id.
105. Id. at n.1.
106. Id. at 569.
107. Id. at 570-71.
108. Id. at 571.
109. Id. at 575-77.
110. Id. at 578.
111. Id. (citing Bourque v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bourque), 303 B.R. 548, 550
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2003).
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obligations and qualify for the favorable treatment of the ICR Plan.”112 The
bankruptcy judge essentially annexed the ICRP as an adjunct of the
bankruptcy court. Rather than overseeing a discharge over a period of
three to five years, a typical length for a Chapter 13 discharge, the court
cited the deferments and forbearances available to the student debtor in the
ICRP “should something drastic happen in her circumstances” to maintain,
essentially, oversight of a twenty-five-year discharge of the student loan,
with the ICRP administering the discharge.113 This converted the ICRP,
with its yearly readjustments for payment based on determinations of a
debtor’s ability to pay, into a quasi-undue burden determination performed
yearly based on changes in Ms. Brunell’s circumstances. Also, the court
did reserve judgment on two very important aspects of the discharge.114
The first of these issues, like Austin, involved the ICRP discharge and the
potential for tax liability as a result of the ICRP discharge being a large
amount.115 The Brunell court held that any tax liability at the end of the
ICRP term, coinciding with the end of Ms. Brunell’s working life, would
be an undue burden and thus dischargeable at that time.116 The Brunell
court also reserved judgment in the circumstance where Ms. Brunell would
be unable to enter the ICRP (or otherwise would be adversely financially
affected) such that it would reconsider a discharge of her loans by a
determination of undue hardship if she could not enter or remain in the
ICRP.117
While both of these cases involved actual adversarial proceedings,
there is no legal or logical barrier to applying the twenty-five-year ICRP
term to eligible student debtors and appending an automatic bankruptcy
discharge of any remaining liability, tax or otherwise, to the end of the
ICRP repayment term. Essentially, a bankruptcy court may invoke the
twenty-five-year ICRP term and append it to a bankruptcy discharge of any
student loan under its broad equitable powers.118 Further, this could be
applied to any student debtor, not just those eligible for the ICRP, as long
as the debtor was not using the bankruptcy code fraudulently.119 If the
112. Brunell, 356 B.R. at 579.
113. Id. at 580. The court specifically referenced the possibility that Ms. Brunell would
cease to receive child support payments. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (describing the power of the courts to issue any order
“necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the] title”).
119. However, the bankruptcy court would potentially have to administer the twentyfive-year discharge for debtors who could not directly enter the ICRP due to incomequalification limitations, or who could not remain in the ICRP the full twenty-five years
until the ICRP discharge occurs. Such a scenario would likely run afoul of the requirement
that a Chapter 13 discharge be limited to no more than five years. 11 U.S.C. 1322(d)
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bankruptcy court were to apply the twenty-five-year discharge, res judicata
would matter little, for the creditor would have twenty-five years in which
to bring an adversarial proceeding against a student debtor attempting a
discharge-by-declaration (and would have little incentive to do so after the
application of the ICRP terms to the bankruptcy discharge). Additionally,
any notice problems would be resolved by the student loan creditor
bringing an adversarial proceeding (and having plenty of time in which to
do so), or by the creditor receiving notice from the Department that the
student debtor had applied for the ICRP. Finally, a twenty-five-year
bankruptcy discharge, in most cases, would leave both the student debtor
and the creditor in the same position as they would be under the ICRP
itself. The IRS is the only party which stands to lose a significant amount
under this scenario (an amount that is likely uncollectible, and is certainly
highly speculative anyway given the length of the ICRP term and the
pending changes to the ICRP regulations). Creditors can fare much better
under the ICRP than they do in a bankruptcy discharge, especially given
the circuit split, because they will often receive either nothing—if the loan
is discharged, or very little—if the debtor is forced into the ICRP outside of
bankruptcy.
Additionally, by extending the discharge within bankruptcy to
match the twenty-five-year repayment term of the ICRP, the creditor has
sufficient time to instigate an adversarial proceeding where undue burden
may be litigated, the creditor’s rights are no more substantially affected by
the bankruptcy determination of undue hardship even if done by
declaration, and the long length of the ICRP repayment term as
transmogrified into a bankruptcy discharge term mitigates the preclusive
effects of res judicata. This creative solution would resolve the circuit split
on res judicata and appropriate notice, and also leave the parties as well off
as they would be under non-bankruptcy law.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHILE EITHER A RULING BY THE SUPREME COURT OR
THE PRINCIPLES DERIVED FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT BANKRUPTCY
COURTS RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT, THE LATTER IS PREFERABLE
Student debtors seeking a discharge of their student loans in
bankruptcy face the high hurdle of showing that the loans are an undue
burden, both at the time of filing and continuing for the life of the loans.
The Ninth Circuit’s Espinosa ruling is a lenient ruling for student debtors,
especially considering the legislative history of the undue burden provision,
the congressional intent behind the undue burden provision, and the other
(2006). The likelihood of this scenario could be a significant drawback to applying the
ICRP to a bankruptcy discharge, unless the Department proves successful in its attempts to
relax the qualification requirements of the ICRP.
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circuits’ opinions. Given the inconsistencies in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
and the dicta in Hood, the Supreme Court is likely to rule against the Ninth
Circuit’s leniency toward student debtors. Because the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion is likely out of line with an eventual determination by the Supreme
Court, the reasoning used by the First Circuit is a potentially better
resolution that appropriately balances the interests of both student debtors
and their creditors.
It is certainly in the best interests of student debtors to argue for a
bankruptcy discharge under the terms of the ICRP as they stand to avoid
both overly burdensome repayments and the potential for the huge tax
liability they would face were they to enter directly into the ICRP and have
their loans discharged through that mechanism alone. They may also avoid
much of the undue burden showing necessary to discharge all of their loans
during the bankruptcy proceeding itself. Even if the regulations being
developed by the Department to end income tax liability for ICRP loan
forgiveness and allow more student debtors to qualify for the ICRP were
adopted, the First Circuit’s reasoning could apply more directly to all
student debtors. Applying this reasoning could also avoid a potential
conflict posed by a change in the regulations that the ICRP be available
only for low-income students. Though such a bankruptcy discharge entails
a lengthy term of repayment, student debtors avoid the uncertainty of a res
judicata decision, which may void their student loan bankruptcy discharge
years after completion of a bankruptcy plan. Student debtors may also save
the cost of litigating an undue burden proceeding. Student loan creditors
also are likely better off as they will receive some repayment under the
ICRP-like payments made by the student debtor during the twenty-fiveyear bankruptcy discharge and will also save the costs of litigating an
undue burden proceeding, or they will, at the very least, have significant
time to determine whether undue burden litigation is worth pursuing
despite the cost. Of course, despite the best efforts to balance the rights
and positions of the debtor-creditor relationship, the entire analysis of an
extended repayment term is subject to the ever-present caveat “creditors
have better memories than debtors.”120

120. Wood, supra note 16, at 49 (attributing the quote to Benjamin Franklin).

